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A framework for discussing relationships between different types of games is proposed. Within the
framework, quantum simultaneous games, finite quantum simultaneous games, quantum sequential
games, and finite quantum sequential games are defined. In addition, a notion of equivalence
between two games is defined. Finally, the following three theorems are shown: (1) For any quantum
simultaneous game G, there exists a quantum sequential game equivalent to G. (2) For any finite
quantum simultaneous game G, there exists a finite quantum sequential game equivalent to G.
(3) For any finite quantum sequential game G, there exists a finite quantum simultaneous game
equivalent to G.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 02.50.Le
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is a well-established branch of applied
mathematics first developed by von Neumann and Mor-
genstern [1]. It offers a mathematical model of a situ-
ation in which decision-makers interact and helps us to
understand what happens in such situations. Although
game theory was originally developed in the context of
economics, it has also been applied to many other disci-
plines in social sciences like political science [2], and even
to biology [3].
Meyer [4] and Eisert et al. [5] brought the game the-
ory into the physics community and created a new field,
quantum game theory. They both quantized a classi-
cal game and found interesting new properties which the
original classical game does not possess. Nevertheless,
their quantized games seem quite different. PQ penny
flipover studied by Meyer is a quantum sequential game,
in which players take turns in performing some opera-
tions on a quantum system. On the other hand, quantum
Prisoners’ Dilemma studied by Eisert et al. is a quan-
tum simultaneous game, in which there are n players and
a quantum system which consists of n subsystems, and
player i performs an operation only on the i-th subsys-
tem.
Since the seminal works of Meyer and Eisert et al.,
many studies have been made to quantize classical games
and find interesting phenomena [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. Most
of the quantum games ever studied are classified into ei-
ther quantum simultaneous games or quantum sequential
games, although not much has been done on the latter.
Now that we see that game theory is combined with
quantum theory and there are two types of quantum
games, several questions naturally arise: (a) Are quan-
tum games truly different from classical games? (b) If
∗Electronic address: kobayashi@ASone.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp; Contact
address: c/o Prof. A. Shimizu, Department of Basic Science, The
University of Tokyo, 3-8-1 Komaba, Tokyo 153-8902, Japan
so, in what sense are they different? (c) What is the
relationship between quantum simultaneous games and
quantum sequential games? To answer these questions,
it is necessary to examine the whole structure of game
theory including classical games and quantum games, not
a particular phenomenon of a particular game.
A work by Lee and Johnson [12] is a study along this
line. They developed a formalism of games including
classical games and quantum games. With the formalism
they addressed the questions (a) and (b), concluding that
“playing games quantum mechanically can be more effi-
cient” and that “finite classical games consist of a strict
subset of finite quantum games”. However, they did not
give a precise definition of the phrase “consist of a strict
subset”.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first is to
present a foundation and terminology for discussing re-
lationships between various types of games. The second
is to answer the question (c). Our conclusions are the
following: (1) For any quantum simultaneous game G,
there exists a quantum sequential game equivalent to G.
(2) For any finite quantum simultaneous game G, there
exists a finite quantum sequential game equivalent to G.
(3) For any finite quantum sequential game G, there ex-
ists a finite quantum simultaneous game equivalent to
G.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, a
framework for describing various types of games and dis-
cussing relationships between them is presented. In Sec-
tion III, we define within the framework a number of
classical and quantum games, including quantum simul-
taneous games and quantum sequential games. In Sec-
tion IV, we define a notion of ‘equivalence’, which is one
of relationships between two games. Some properties of
equivalence and a sufficient condition for equivalence are
also examined. Section V gives the definition of game
classes and some binary relations between game classes.
In Section VI, we prove the three theorems mentioned
above. Finally, in Section VII, we discuss some conse-
quences of the theorems.
2II. FRAMEWORK FOR THE THEORY
In order to discuss relationships between different
types of games, we need a common framework in which
various types of games are described. As the first step in
our analysis, we will construct such a framework for our
theory.
For the construction, a good place to start is to con-
sider what is game theory. Game theory is the mathe-
matical study of game situations which is characterized
by the following three features:
1. There are two or more decision-makers, or players.
2. Each player develops his/her strategy for pursuing
his/her objectives. On the basis of the strategy,
he/she chooses his/her action from possible alter-
natives.
3. As a result of all players’ actions, some situation is
realized. Whether the situation is preferable or not
for one player depends not only on his/her action,
but also on the other players’ actions.
How much the realized situation is preferable for a
player is quantified by a real number called a payoff.
Using this term, we can rephrase the second feature as
“each player develops his/her strategy to maximize the
expectation value of his/her payoff”. The reason why the
expectation value is used to evaluate strategies is that
we can determine the resulting situation only probabilis-
tically in general, even when all players’ strategies are
known.
As a mathematical representation of the three features
of game situations, we define a normal form of a game.
Definition 1. A normal form of a game is a triplet
(N,Ω, f) whose components satisfy the following condi-
tions.
• N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a finite set.
• Ω = Ω1 × · · · × Ωn, where Ωi is a nonempty set.
• f is a function from Ω to Rn.
Here, N denotes a set of players. Ωi is a set of player
i’s strategies, which prescribes how he/she acts. The i-th
element of f(ω1, . . . , ωn) is the expectation value of the
payoff for player i, when player j adopts a strategy ωj.
Next, we propose a general definition of games, which
works as a framework for discussing relationship between
various kinds of games. We can regard a game as con-
sisting of some ‘entities’ (like players, cards, coins, etc.)
and a set of rules under which a game situation occurs.
We model the ‘entities’ in the form of a tuple T . Fur-
thermore, we represent the game situation caused by the
‘entities’ T under a rule R as a normal form of a game,
and write it as R(T ). Using these formulations, we define
a game as follows.
Definition 2. We define a game as a pair (T,R), where
T is a tuple, and R is a rule which determines uniquely
a normal form from T . When G = (T,R) is a game, we
refer to R(T ) as the normal form of the game G. We
denote the set of all games by G.
The conception of the above definition will be clearer
if we describe various kinds of games in the form of the
pair defined above. This will be done in the next section.
Thus far, we have implicitly regarded strategies and
actions of individual players as elementary components
of a game. In classical game theory, such modeling of
games is referred to as a noncooperative game, in contrast
to a cooperative game in which strategies and actions of
groups of players are elementary. However, we will call a
pair in Definition 2 simply a game, because we will deal
with only noncooperative games in this paper.
III. VARIOUS TYPES OF GAMES
In this section, various types of classical games and
quantum games are introduced. First, we confirm that
strategic games, which is a well-established representa-
tion of games in classical game theory (see e.g. [13]), can
be described in the framework of Definition 2. Then, we
define two quantum games, namely, quantum simultane-
ous games and quantum sequential games.
A. Strategic Games
We can redefine strategic games using the framework
of Definition 2 as follows.
Definition 3. A strategic game is a game (T,R) which
has the following form.
1. T = (N,S, f), and each component satisfies the
following condition.
• N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a finite set.
• S = S1×· · ·×Sn, where Si is a nonempty set.
• f : S 7→ Rn is a function from S to Rn.
2. R(T ) = T = (N,S, f).
If the set Si is finite for all i, then we call the game (T,R)
a finite strategic game. We denote the set of all strategic
games by SG, and the set of all finite strategic games by
FSG.
Definition 4. Let G = ((N,S, f), R) be a finite strategic
game. Then the mixed extension of G is a game G∗ =
((N,S, f), R∗), where the rule R∗ is described as follows.
• R∗(N,S, f) = (N,Q, F ), where Q and F are of the
following forms.
• Q = Q1× · · · ×Qn, where Qi is the set of all prob-
ability distribution over Si.
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FIG. 1: The setup of a quantum simultaneous game.
• F : Q 7→ Rn assigns to each (q1, . . . , qn) ∈ Q the
expected value of f . That is, the value of F is given
by
F (q1, . . . , qn)
=
∑
s1∈S1
· · ·
∑
sn∈Sn
{
n∏
i=1
qi(si)
}
f(s1, . . . , sn), (1)
where qi(si) is the probability attached to si.
We denote the set of all mixed extensions of finite strate-
gic games by MEFSG.
B. Quantum Simultaneous Games
Quantum simultaneous games are quantum games in
which a quantum system is used according to a proto-
col depicted in Fig. 1. In quantum simultaneous games,
there are n players who can not communicate with each
other, and a referee. The referee prepares a quantum sys-
tem in the initial state ρˆinit. The quantum system is com-
posed of n subsystems, where the Hilbert space for the
i-th subsystem is Hi. The referee provides player i with
the i-th subsystem. Each player performs some quantum
operation on the provided subsystem. It is determined in
advance which operations are available for each player.
After all players finish their operations, they return the
subsystems to the referee. Then the referee performs a
POVM measurement {Mˆr} on the total system. If the
r-th measurement outcome is obtained, player i receives
a payoff air.
Many studies on quantum simultaneous games have
been carried out. Early significant studies include Refs.
[5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
The protocol of the quantum simultaneous games is
formulated in the form of Definition 2 as below.
Definition 5. A quantum simultaneous game is a game
(T,R) which has the following form.
1. T = (N,H, ρˆinit,Ω, {Mˆr}, {ar}), and each compo-
nent satisfies the following condition.
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FIG. 2: The setup of a quantum sequential game.
• N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a finite set.
• H = H1⊗H2⊗· · ·⊗Hn, where Hi is a Hilbert
space.
• ρˆinit is a density operator on H.
• Ω = Ω1 ×Ω2 × · · · × Ωn, where Ωi is a subset
of the set of all CPTP (completely positive
trace preserving) maps on the set of density
operators on Hi. In other words, Ωi is a set
of quantum operations available for player i.
• {Mˆr} is a POVM on H.
• ar = (a1r, a2r, . . . , anr ) ∈ Rn. The index r of ar
runs over the same domain as that of Mˆr.
2. R(T ) = (N,Ω, f). The value of f is given by
f(E1, . . . , En) =
∑
r
arTr
[
Mˆr(E1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ En)(ρˆinit)
]
(2)
for all (E1, . . . , En) ∈ Ω.
If Hi is finite dimensional for all i, then we refer to the
game (T,R) as a finite quantum simultaneous game. We
denote the set of all quantum simultaneous games by
QSim, and the set of all finite quantum simultaneous
games by FQSim.
C. Quantum Sequential Games
Quantum sequential games are another type of quan-
tum games, in which a quantum system is used accord-
ing to a protocol depicted in Fig. 2. In quantum se-
quential games, there are n players who can not com-
municate each other and a referee. The referee prepares
a quantum system in the initial state ρˆinit. The play-
ers performs quantum operations on the quantum sys-
tem in turn. The order of the turn may be regular like
1→ 2→ 3→ 1→ 2→ 3→ · · · , or may be irregular like
1 → 3 → 2 → 3 → 1 → 2 → · · · , yet it is determined in
advance. After all the m operations are finished, the ref-
eree performs a POVM measurement {Mˆr}. If the r-th
measurement outcome is obtained, then player i receives
a payoff air.
Games which belong to quantum sequential games in-
clude PQ penny flipover [4], quantum Monty Hall prob-
lem [10], and quantum truel [11].
The protocol of the quantum sequential games is for-
mulated as follows.
Definition 6. A quantum sequential game is a game
(T,R) which has the following form.
41. T = (N,H, ρˆinit, Q, µ, {Mˆr}, {ar}), and each com-
ponent satisfies the following condition.
• N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a finite set.
• H is a Hilbert space.
• ρˆinit is a density operator on H.
• Q = Q1 ×Q2 × · · · ×Qm, where Qk is a sub-
set of the set of all CPTP maps on the set of
density operators on H. The total number of
operations is denoted by m.
• µ is a bijection from ⋃ni=1{(i, j)|1 ≤ j ≤ mi}
to {1, . . . ,m}, wheremi’s are natural numbers
satisfying m1 + · · · +mn = m. The meaning
of µ is that the j-th operation for player i is
the µ(i, j)-th operation in total.
• {Mˆr} is a POVM on H.
• ar = (a1r , a2r, . . . , anr ) ∈ Rn. The index r of ar
runs over the same domain as that of Mˆr.
2. R(T ) = (N,Ω, f). The strategy space Ω = Ω1 ×
· · · × Ωn is constructed as
Ωi = Qµ(i,1) ×Qµ(i,2) × · · · ×Qµ(i,mi). (3)
The value of f is given by
f
(
(Eµ(1,1), . . . , Eµ(1,m1)), . . . , (Eµ(n,1), . . . , Eµ(n,mn))
)
=
∑
r
arTr
[
MˆrEm ◦ Em−1 ◦ · · · ◦ E1(ρˆinit)
]
(4)
for all(
(Eµ(1,1), . . . , Eµ(1,m1)), . . . , (Eµ(n,1), . . . , Eµ(n,mn))
)
in Ω.
If H is finite dimensional, then we refer to the game
(T,R) as a finite quantum sequential game. We denote
the set of all quantum sequential games by QSeq, and
the set of all finite quantum sequential games by FQSeq.
IV. EQUIVALENCE OF GAMES
In this section, we define equivalence between two
games. The basic idea is that two games are equiva-
lent if their normal forms have the same structure, for
the essence of a game is a game situation which is mod-
eled by a normal form. The difficulty of this idea is that
a strategy set Ωi may have some redundancy; that is,
two or more elements in Ωi may represent essentially the
same strategy. If this is the case, it does not work well to
compare the strategy sets directly to judge whether two
games are equivalent or not. Instead, we should define a
new normal form in which the redundancy in the strat-
egy set is excluded from the original normal form, and
then compare the new normal forms of the two games.
As the first step to define equivalence between games,
we clarify what it means by “two elements in Ωi represent
essentially the same strategy”.
Definition 7. Let (N,Ω, f) be a normal form of a game.
Two strategies ωi, ω
′
i ∈ Ωi for player i are said to be
redundant if
f(ω1 . . . ωi−1, ωi, ωi+1 . . . ωn)
= f(ω1 . . . ωi−1, ω
′
i, ωi+1 . . . ωn) (5)
for all ω1 ∈ Ω1, . . . , ωi−1 ∈ Ωi−1, ωi+1 ∈ Ωi+1, . . . , ωn ∈
Ωn. If two strategies ωi, ω
′
i ∈ Ωi are redundant, we write
ωi ∼ ω′i.
We can show that the binary relation ∼ is an equiva-
lence relation. Namely, for all elements ω, ω′, and ω′′ of
Ωi, the following holds:
1. ω ∼ ω.
2. If ω ∼ ω′ then ω′ ∼ ω.
3. If ω ∼ ω′ and ω′ ∼ ω′′ then ω ∼ ω′′.
Since ∼ is an equivalence relation, we can define the
quotient set Ω˜i of a strategy set Ωi by ∼. The quotient
set Ω˜i is the set of all equivalence classes in Ωi. An
equivalence class in Ωi is a subset of Ωi which has the
form of {ω |ω ∈ Ωi, a ∼ ω}, where a is an element of
Ωi. We denote by [ω] an equivalence class in which ω is
included, and we define Ω˜ as Ω˜ ≡ Ω˜1 × · · · × Ω˜n. This Ω˜
is a new strategy set which has no redundancy.
Next, we define a new expected payoff function f˜ which
maps Ω˜ to Rn by
f˜([ω1], . . . , [ωn]) = f(ω1, . . . , ωn). (6)
This definition says that for (C1, . . . , Cn) ∈ Ω˜, the value
of f˜(C1, . . . , Cn) is determined by taking one element ωi
from each Ci and evaluating f(ω1, . . . , ωn).
f˜ is well-defined. That is to say, the value of
f˜(C1, . . . , Cn) is independent of which element in Ci one
would choose. To show this, suppose (C1, . . . , Cn) ∈ Ω˜
and αi, βi ∈ Ci. Then αi ∼ βi for every i, so that
f(α1, α2, α3, . . . , αn) = f(β1, α2, α3, . . . , αn) (7)
= f(β1, β2, α3, . . . , αn) (8)
...
= f(β1, β2, β3, . . . , βn). (9)
Thus the value of f˜(C1, . . . , Cn) is determined uniquely.
Using Ω˜ and f˜ constructed from the original normal
form (N,Ω, f), we define the new normal form as follows.
Definition 8. Let (N,Ω, f) be the normal form of a
game G. We refer to (N, Ω˜, f˜) as the reduced normal
form of G.
Whether two games are equivalent or not is judged by
comparing the reduced normal forms of these games, as
we mentioned earlier.
5TABLE I: Payoff matrix for PQ penny flipover. F denotes
a flipover and N denotes no flipover. The first entry in the
parenthesis denotes P ’s payoff and the second one denotes Q’s
payoff.
Q: NN Q: NF Q: FN Q: FF
P : N (−1, 1) (1,−1) (1,−1) (−1, 1)
P : F (1,−1) (−1, 1) (−1, 1) (1,−1)
TABLE II: Payoff matrix for another PQ penny flipover in
which both players act only once.
Q: N Q: F
P : N (−1, 1) (1,−1)
P : F (1,−1) (−1, 1)
Definition 9. Let (N (1), Ω˜(1), f˜ (1)) be the reduced nor-
mal form of a game G1, and let (N
(2), Ω˜(2), f˜ (2)) be the
reduced normal form of a game G2. Then, G1 is said to
be equivalent to G2 if the following holds.
1. N (1) = N (2) = {1, . . . , n}.
2. There exists a sequence (φ1, . . . , φn) of bijection
φk : Ω˜
(1)
k 7→ Ω˜(2)k , such that for all (C1, . . . , Cn) ∈
Ω˜(1)
f˜ (1)(C1, . . . , Cn) = f˜
(2)(φ1(C1), . . . , φn(Cn)). (10)
If G1 is equivalent to G2, we write G1 ‖ G2.
To give an example of equivalent games, let us consider
classical PQ penny flipover [4], in which both player P
and player Q are classical players. In this game, a penny
is placed initially heads up in a box. Players take turns
(Q → P → Q) flipping the penny over or not. Each
player can not know what the opponent did, nor see in-
side the box. Finally the box is opened, and Q wins if
the penny is heads up. This game can be formulated as
a finite strategic game whose payoff matrix is given in
Table I.
Intuitively, Q does not benefit from the second move,
so that it does not matter whether Q can do the second
move or not. The notion of equivalence captures this
intuition; the above penny flipover game is equivalent to a
finite strategic game whose payoff matrix is given in Table
II. It represents another penny flipover game in which
both players act only once. Proof of the equivalence is
easy and we omit it.
We now return to the general discussion on the notion
of equivalence. The following is a basic property of the
equivalence between two games.
Lemma 1. The binary relation ‖ is an equivalence rela-
tion; namely, for any games G1, G2, and G3, the follow-
ing holds.
1. G1 ‖ G1 (reflexivity).
2. If G1 ‖ G2, then G2 ‖ G1 (symmetry).
3. If G1 ‖ G2 and G2 ‖ G3, then G1 ‖ G3 (transitiv-
ity).
Proof. For the proof, let (N (i), Ω˜(i), f˜ (i)) be the reduced
normal form of Gi.
The reflexivity is evident.
Let us prove the symmetry. Assume G1 ‖ G2. Then
N (1) = N (2), and there exists a sequence (φ1, . . . , φn)
of bijection φk : Ω˜
(1)
k 7→ Ω˜(2)k , such that for all
(C1, . . . , Cn) ∈ Ω˜(1),
f˜ (1)(C1, . . . , Cn) = f˜
(2)(φ1(C1), . . . , φn(Cn)). (11)
Then, there exists a sequence (φ−11 , . . . , φ
−1
n ) of bijection
φ−1k : Ω˜
(2)
k 7→ Ω˜(1)k , such that for any (D1, . . . , Dn) ∈ Ω˜(2),
f˜ (2)(D1, . . . , Dn) = f˜
(1)(φ−11 (D1), . . . , φ
−1
n (Dn)). (12)
Thus, G2 ‖ G1.
We proceed to the proof of the transitivity. Assume
G1 ‖ G2 and G2 ‖ G3. Then N (1) = N (2) and N (2) =
N (3), which leads to N (1) = N (3). Furthermore, (i) there
exists a sequence (φ1, . . . , φn) of bijection φk : Ω˜
(1)
k 7→
Ω˜
(2)
k such that for all (C1, . . . , Cn) ∈ Ω˜(1),
f˜ (1)(C1, . . . , Cn) = f˜
(2)(φ1(C1), . . . , φn(Cn)), (13)
and (ii) there exists a sequence (ψ1, . . . , ψn) of bijection
ψk : Ω˜
(2)
k 7→ Ω˜(3)k such that for all (D1, . . . , Dn) ∈ Ω˜(2)
f˜ (2)(D1, . . . , Dn) = f˜
(3)(ψ1(D1), . . . , ψn(Dn)). (14)
Combining the statements (i) and (ii), we obtain
the following statement: there exists a sequence
(ψ1 ◦ φ1, . . . , ψn ◦ φn) of bijection ψk ◦ φk : Ω˜(1)k 7→ Ω˜(3)k
such that for all (C1, . . . , Cn) ∈ Ω˜(1),
f˜ (1)(C1, . . . , Cn)
= f˜ (3)(ψ1 ◦ φ1(C1), . . . , ψn ◦ φn(Cn)). (15)
Thus we conclude that G1 ‖ G3.
In some cases, we can find that two games are equiva-
lent by comparing the normal forms of the games, not the
reduced normal forms. In the following lemma, sufficient
conditions for such cases are presented.
Lemma 2. Let (N (1),Ω(1), f (1)) be the normal form of
a game G1, and let (N
(2),Ω(2), f (2)) be the normal form
of a game G2. If the following conditions are satisfied,
G1 is equivalent to G2:
1. N (1) = N (2) = {1, . . . , n}.
62. There exists a sequence (ψ1, . . . , ψn) of bijection
ψk : Ω
(1)
k 7→ Ω(2)k , such that for all (ω1, . . . , ωn) ∈
Ω(1),
f (1)(ω1, . . . , ωn) = f
(2)(ψ1(ω1), . . . , ψn(ωn)). (16)
Proof. We will show that if the above conditions are sat-
isfied, the conditions in the definition 9 are also satisfied.
From the condition 1 in the lemma, the condition 1 in
the definition 9 is obviously satisfied.
To show that the condition 2 in the definition 9 is also
satisfied, we define a map φi from Ω˜
(1)
i to the set of all
subsets of Ω
(2)
i as
φi(Ci) = {ψi(ω′) |ω′ ∈ Ci}. (17)
We will show that (φ1, . . . , φn) is a sequence which sat-
isfies the condition 2 in the definition 9.
First, we show that the range of φi is a subset of Ω˜
(2)
i ;
that is, for any [ωi] ∈ Ω˜(1)i there exists ξi ∈ Ω(2)i such
that φi([ωi]) = [ξi]. In fact, ψi(ωi) is such a ξi:
φi([ωi]) = [ψi(ωi)]. (18)
Below, we will prove φi([ωi]) ⊂ [ψi(ωi)] first, and then
prove [ψi(ωi)] ⊂ φi([ωi]).
To prove φi([ωi]) ⊂ [ψi(ωi)], we will show that an ar-
bitrary element σi ∈ φi([ωi]) satisfies σi ∈ [ψi(ωi)]. For
this purpose, it is sufficient to show that σi ∼ ψi(ωi);
that is, for an arbitrary σk ∈ Ω(2)k (k 6= i)
f (2)(σ1, . . . , σi−1, σi, σi+1, . . . , σn)
= f (2)(σ1, . . . , σi−1, ψi(ωi), σi+1, . . . , σn). (19)
Since ψk is a bijection, there exists ωk ∈ Ω(1)k such that
ψk(ωk) = σk. In addition, because σi ∈ φi([ωi]), there
exists ω′i ∈ [ωi] such that σi = ψi(ω′i). Thus,
f (2)(σ1, . . . , σi−1, σi, σi+1, . . . , σn)
= f (2)(ψ1(ω1), . . . ,ψi−1(ωi−1), ψi(ω
′
i),
ψi+1(ωi+1), . . . , ψn(ωn))
= f (1)(ω1, . . . , ωi−1, ω
′
i, ωi+1, . . . , ωn). (20)
The last equation follows from (16). Because ω′i ∈ [ωi]
and ωi ∈ [ωi], it follows that ω′i ∼ ωi. Hence,
(20) = f (1)(ω1, . . . , ωi−1, ωi, ωi+1, . . . , ωn)
= f (2)(ψ1(ω1), . . . ,ψi−1(ωi−1), ψi(ωi),
ψi+1(ωi+1), . . . , ψn(ωn))
= f (2)(σ1, . . . , σi−1, ψi(ωi), σi+1, . . . , σn), (21)
which leads to the conclusion that the equation (19) holds
for any σi ∈ φi([ωi]).
Conversely, we can show that [ψi(ωi)] ⊂ φi([ωi]). Let
σi be an arbitrary element of [ψi(ωi)]. Since ψi is a bi-
jection, there exists ω′i ∈ Ω(1)i such that ψi(ω′i) = σi.
For such ω′i, it holds that ψi(ω
′
i) ∼ ψi(ωi), because
ψi(ω
′
i) ∈ [ψi(ωi)]. Hence,
f (1)(ω1, . . . , ωi−1, ω
′
i, ωi+1, . . . , ωn)
= f (2)(ψ1(ω1), . . . ,ψi−1(ωi−1), ψi(ω
′
i),
ψi+1(ωi+1), . . . , ψn(ωn))
= f (2)(ψ1(ω1), . . . ,ψi−1(ωi−1), ψi(ωi),
ψi+1(ωi+1), . . . , ψn(ωn))
= f (1)(ω1, . . . , ωi−1, ωi, ωi+1, . . . , ωn), (22)
which indicates that ω′i ∼ ωi. Thus, ω′i ∈ [ωi]. Therefore,
we conclude that if σi ∈ [ψi(ωi)], then σi = ψi(ω′i) ∈
φi([ωi]); that is, [ψi(ωi)] ⊂ φi([ωi]).
We have shown above that φi is a map from Ω˜
(1)
i to
Ω˜
(2)
i . The next thing we have to show is that φi is a
bijection from Ω˜
(1)
i to Ω˜
(2)
i . We will show the bijectivity
of φi by proving injectivity and surjectivity separately.
First, we show that φi is injective. Suppose
[ωi], [ω
′
i] ∈ Ω˜(1)i and [ωi] 6= [ω′i]. Because [ωi] 6=
[ω′i], it follows that ωi ≁ ω
′
i, so that there exists
(ω1, . . . , ωi−1, ωi+1, . . . , ωn) ∈ Ω(1)1 × · · · ×Ω(1)i−1 ×Ω(1)i+1 ×
· · · × Ω(1)n such that
f (1)(ω1, . . . , ωi−1, ωi, ωi+1, . . . , ωn)
6= f (1)(ω1, . . . , ωi−1, ω′i, ωi+1, . . . , ωn). (23)
For such (ω1, . . . , ωi−1, ωi+1, . . . , ωn),
f (2)(ψ1(ω1), . . . ,ψi−1(ωi−1), ψi(ωi),
ψi+1(ωi+1), . . . , ψn(ωn))
= f (1)(ω1, . . . , ωi−1, ωi, ωi+1, . . . , ωn)
6= f (1)(ω1, . . . , ωi−1, ω′i, ωi+1, . . . , ωn)
= f (2)(ψ1(ω1), . . . ,ψi−1(ωi−1), ψi(ω
′
i),
ψi+1(ωi+1), . . . , ψn(ωn)).
(24)
This indicates that ψi(ωi) ≁ ψi(ω′i). Hence, [ψi(ωi)] 6=
[ψi(ω
′
i)]. Thus, using (18), we conclude that φi([ωi]) 6=
φi([ω
′
i]).
Next, we show that φi is surjective. Let [σ] be an ar-
bitrary element of Ω˜
(2)
i . Define ω ∈ Ω(1)i as ω ≡ ψ−1i (σ).
Then,
φi([ω]) = [ψi(ω)] = [σ]. (25)
The first equation follows from (18). Thus, for an ar-
bitrary [σ] ∈ Ω˜(2)i , there exists [ω] ∈ Ω˜(1)i such that
φi([ω]) = [σ].
Lastly, we show that (φ1, . . . , φn) satisfies (10). For an
arbitrary ([ω1], . . . , [ωn]) ∈ Ω˜(1),
f˜ (1)([ω1], . . . , [ωn]) = f
(1)(ω1, . . . , ωn) (26)
= f (2)(ψ1(ω1), . . . , ψn(ωn)) (27)
= f˜ (2)([ψ1(ω1)], . . . , [ψn(ωn)]) (28)
= f˜ (2)(φ1([ω1]), . . . , φn([ωn])). (29)
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FIG. 3: A quantum sequential game Gseq which is equivalent
to a quantum simultaneous game G depicted in Fig. 1.
Equations (26) and (28) follow from the definition of f˜ (1)
and f˜ (2). Equation (27) follows from (16). The last equa-
tion follows from (18).
V. GAME CLASSES
This short section is devoted to explaining game classes
and some binary relations between game classes. These
notions simplify the statements of our main theorems.
First, we define a game class as a subset of G.
We defined previously G, SG, FSG, MEFSG, QSim,
FQSim, QSeq, and FQSeq. All of these are game
classes. Note that G is itself a game class.
Next, we introduce some symbols. Let A and B be
game classes. If for any game G ∈ A there exists a game
G′ ∈ B such that G ‖ G′, then we write A E B. If
A E B and B E A, we write A ⊲⊳ B. If A E B but
B 5 A, we write A ⊳ B.
Lastly, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The binary relation E is a preorder. Namely,
for any game classes A, B, and C, the following holds.
1. A E A (reflexivity).
2. If A E B and B E C, then A E C (transitivity).
Proof. The reflexivity is evident. So we concentrate on
proving the transitivity.
Assume A E B and B E C. Because A E B, for any
Ga ∈ A there exists Gb ∈ B such that Ga ‖ Gb. For such
Gb, there exists Gc ∈ C such that Gb ‖ Gc, since B E C.
Using the transitivity of the relation ‖, we conclude that
for any Ga ∈ A there exists Gc ∈ C such that Ga ‖ Gc;
that is, A E C.
VI. MAIN THEOREMS
In this section, we examine relationships between game
classes QSim, QSeq, FQSim, and FQSeq.
Theorem 1. QSim E QSeq.
Proof. We prove the theorem by constructing a quan-
tum sequential game Gseq equivalent to a given quantum
simultaneous game G. We show the construction proce-
dure of Gseq first, and then prove the equivalence using
Lemma 2.
The idea for the construction of Gseq is that a quantum
simultaneous game depicted in Fig. 1 can always be seen
as a quantum sequential game, as indicated in Fig. 3.
Suppose G is in the following form:
G = (T,R), (30)
T = (N,H, ρˆinit,Ω, {Mˆr}, {ar}), (31)
R(T ) = (N,Ω, f). (32)
Furthermore, suppose Gseq to be constructed is in the
following form:
Gseq = (T seq, Rseq), (33)
T seq = (N seq,Hseq, ρˆseqinit, Qseq, µseq, {Mˆ seqr }, {aseqr }),
(34)
Rseq(T seq) = (N seq,Ωseq, f seq). (35)
We construct each component of T seq from G as follows.
• N seq = N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• Hseq = H = H1 ⊗H2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Hn.
• ρˆseqinit = ρˆinit.
• Qseq = Qseq1 ×Qseq2 × · · · ×Qseqn , where
Q
seq
i = {I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I ⊗ (E)i ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I | E ∈ Ωi}.
Here, I is the identity superoperator.
• µseq is a map from {(i, 1) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} to
{1, 2, . . . , n}. The value of µseq is defined by
µseq(i, 1) = i.
• {Mˆ seqr } = {Mˆr}.
• {aseqr } = {ar}.
Note that Ωseqi = Qi because of the construction of Q
seq
and µseq.
Next, we prove that Gseq constructed above is equiva-
lent toG, using Lemma 2. FromN seq = N , condition 1 of
the Lemma 2 is satisfied. To show that condition 2 of the
Lemma 2 is also satisfied, we define a map ψi : Ωi 7→ Ωseqi
by
ψi(E) ≡ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I ⊗ (E)i ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I. (36)
Then, ψi is clearly a bijection. Furthermore, for any
(E1, . . . , En) ∈ Ω,
f(E1, . . . , En) = f seq(ψ1(E1), . . . , ψn(En)). (37)
Thus condition 2 of the Lemma 2 is satisfied.
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FIG. 4: A finite quantum simultaneous game Gsim which is
equivalent to a given finite quantum sequential game G.
From the above proof, we can easily see that the fol-
lowing theorem is also true.
Theorem 2. FQSim E FQSeq.
The converse of Theorem 2 is the following theorem.
Theorem 3. FQSeq E FQSim.
Proof. We prove the theorem by constructing a finite
quantum simultaneous game Gsim equivalent to a given
finite quantum simultaneous game G. We show the con-
struction procedure of Gsim first, and then prove the
equivalence between Gsim and G.
Suppose G is in the following form:
G = (T,R), (38)
T = (N,H, ρˆinit, Q, µ, {Mˆr}r∈R, {ar}), (39)
R(T ) = (N,Ω, f). (40)
From the above G, We construct a finite quantum simul-
taneous game Gsim which is in the following form:
Gsim = (T sim, Rsim), (41)
T sim = (N sim,Hsim, ρˆsiminit,Ωsim, {Mˆ sim(i,r)}, {asim(i,r)}), (42)
Rsim(T sim) = (N sim,Ωsim, f sim). (43)
Figure 4 indicates the setting for Gsim. The precise in-
struction on how to construct each component of T sim is
given below:
• N sim = N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• Hsim = Hsim1 ⊗ Hsim2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Hsimn , where Hsimi =
H⊗2mi and mi is the number explained in Defi-
nition 6. This construction means that in game
Gsim, the referee provides player i with a subsys-
tem which is itself composed of the 2mi subsystems,
each of which is the same system as the one used in
the original quantum sequential game G. We write
the Hilbert space of the j-th subsystem of 2mi sub-
systems for player i as Hsim(i,j). Likewise, we write a
state vector in Hsim(i,j) as |ψ〉(i,j) and a operator on
Hsim(i,j) as Aˆ(i,j).
• Define a map ν : {1, 2, . . . ,m} 7→ ⋃ni=1{(i,mi +
j) | 1 ≤ j ≤ mi} by
ν(k) ≡ µ−1(k) + (0,mi(k)), (44)
where i(k) is the first element of µ−1(k). In ad-
dition, let {|1〉(i,j), . . . , |d〉(i,j)} be an orthonormal
basis ofHsim(i,j), where d is the dimension ofH. Then,
ρˆsiminit is constructed as
ρˆsiminit = (ρˆinit)µ−1(1) ⊗ |1〉ν(m)〈1|ν(m)
m−1⊗
a=1
(
1√
d
d∑
ia=1
|ia〉ν(a)|ia〉µ−1(a+1)
)
 1√
d
d∑
ja=1
〈ja|ν(a)〈ja|µ−1(a+1)

 . (45)
• Ωsim = Ωsim1 × Ωsim2 × · · · × Ωsimn , where
Ωsimi = {Eµ(i,1)⊗Eµ(i,2)⊗· · ·⊗Eµ(i,mi)⊗I⊗I⊗· · ·⊗I
| Eµ(i,1) ∈ Qµ(i,1), . . . , Eµ(i,mi) ∈ Qµ(i,mi)}. (46)
• In the game Gsim, measurement outcomes are de-
scribed by a pair of variables (i, r), where i takes
the value of 1 or 2, and r is an element of R (the
index set of the POVM in the original game G).
Corresponding POVM elements are defined by
Mˆ sim(1,r) = Kˆ ⊗ (Mˆr)µ−1(m) ⊗ Iˆν(m), (47)
Mˆ sim(2,r) = (Iˆ − Kˆ)⊗ (Mˆr)µ−1(m) ⊗ Iˆν(m). (48)
Here, Kˆ is defined by
9Kˆ ≡
m−1⊗
b=1
(
1√
d
d∑
kb=1
|kb〉µ−1(b)|kb〉ν(b)
)(
1√
d
d∑
lb=1
〈lb|µ−1(b)〈lb|ν(b)
)
. (49)
Mˆ sim(1,r) and Mˆ
sim
(2,r) turn out to be positive operators,
if we note that Kˆ and Iˆ−Kˆ are projection operators
and Mˆr is a positive operator. Furthermore, the
completeness condition is satisfied:
2∑
i=1
∑
r∈R
Mˆ sim(i,r) = Iˆ . (50)
Thus, it is confirmed that {Mˆ sim(i,r)} is a POVM.
• We set asim(i,r) as
a
sim
(i,r) =
{
d2m−2ar if i = 1,
0 if i = 2.
(51)
Next, we prove that Gsim constructed above is equiva-
lent to G, using Lemma 2. From N sim = N , condition 1
of the lemma is satisfied. To show that condition 2 of the
lemma is also satisfied, we define a map ψi : Ω
sim
i 7→ Ωi
by
ψi(Eµ(i,1) ⊗ Eµ(i,2) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Eµ(i,mi) ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I)
= (Eµ(i,1), Eµ(i,2), . . . , Eµ(i,mi)). (52)
Then, ψi is a bijection. Furthermore, for any element(
(Eµ(1,1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Eµ(1,m1) ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I), . . . ,
(Eµ(n,1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Eµ(n,mn) ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I)
)
, (53)
of Ωsim, one can show after a bit of algebra that
f sim
(
(Eµ(1,1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Eµ(1,m1) ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I), . . . ,
(Eµ(n,1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Eµ(n,mn) ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I)
)
= f
(
ψ1(Eµ(1,1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Eµ(1,m1) ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I), . . . ,
ψn(Eµ(n,1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Eµ(n,mn) ⊗ I ⊗ · · · ⊗ I)
)
. (54)
Thus, condition 2 of Lemma 2 is satisfied.
VII. DISCUSSION
Using Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, we can deduce a
statement about FQSeq (FQSim) from a statement
about FQSim (FQSeq). More precisely, when a state-
ment “if G ∈ FQSim then G has a property P” is true,
another statement “if G ∈ FQSeq then G has a prop-
erty P” is also true, and vice versa. Here, P must be
such a property that if a game G has the property P and
G ‖ G′, then G′ also has the property P . We call such
P a property preserved under ‖. For example, “a Nash
equilibrium exists” is a property preserved under ‖.
Unfortunately, no results are known which have the
form “if G ∈ FQSim (FQSeq) then G has a property
P , but otherwise G does not necessarily have the prop-
erty P”. Consequently, we cannot reap the benefits of
the above-mentioned deduction. However, numerous re-
sults exist which have the form “for a certain subset S
of FQSim (FQSeq), if G ∈ S then G has a property
Q preserved under ‖, but otherwise G does not necessar-
ily have the property Q”. For such S and Q, Theorem
2 and Theorems 3 guarantee that there exists a subset
S′ of FQSeq (FQSim) which satisfies the following: “If
G ∈ S′ then G has the property Q, but otherwise G
does not necessarily have the property Q”. In this sense,
many of the results so far on FQSim (FQSeq) can be
translated into statements on FQSeq (FQSim).
It is worth noting that efficiency of a game [14] is not
a property preserved under ‖. A good example is in the
proof of Theorem 3. In an original quantum sequential
game G, it is necessary to transmit a qudit m+ 1 times,
while 4m times are needed in the constructed game Gsim.
Thus, Gsim is far more inefficient than G, despite Gsim
and G are equivalent games.
Relevant to the present paper is the study by Lee and
Johnson [12]. To describe their argument, we have to
introduce a new game class.
Definition 10. A finite quantum simultaneous game
with all CPTP maps available is a subclass of finite quan-
tum simultaneous games, in which a strategy set Ωi is
the set of all CPTP maps on the set of density operators
on Hi for every i. We denote the set of all finite quan-
tum simultaneous game with all CPTP maps available
by FQSimAll.
We can easily prove that FQSimAll ⊳ FQSim, by
showing that the range of expected payoff functions for
a game in FQSimAll must be connected, while the one
for a game in FQSim can be disconnected.
Lee and Johnson claimed that (i) “any game could be
played classically” and (ii) “finite classical games consist
of a strict subset of finite quantum games”. Using the
terms of this paper, we may interpret these claims as
follows.
Theorem 4. SG ⊲⊳G.
Theorem 5. MEFSG E FQSimAll.
Proposition 6. FQSimAll 5MEFSG.
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We can prove Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, regardless
of whether or not our interpretations of the claims (i)
and (ii) are correct. In contrast, we have not yet proven
Proposition 6, which is the reason why we call it a propo-
sition. Nonetheless Lee and Johnson gave a proof of the
statement (ii), so that if the interpretation that the state-
ment (ii) means Theorem 5 and Proposition 6 is correct,
Proposition 6 will be a theorem.
Using Lemma 3 and assuming that Proposition 6 is
true, relationships between various game classes can be
summarized as follows:
MEFSG ⊳FQSimAll ⊳ FQSim ⊲⊳ FQSeq
E QSim E QSeq E SG ⊲⊳ G. (55)
Replacing E in (55) with either ⊳ or ⊲⊳ will be a possible
extension of this paper.
Besides that, it remains to be investigated what the
characterizing features of each game class in (55) are.
Especially, further research on games which is in FQSim
(or equivalently FQSeq) but not equivalent to any games
in MEFSG would clarify the truly quantum mechanical
nature of quantum games.
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